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Abstract
We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their
allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the
presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of
any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations
of an existing cake cutting mechanism.
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1 Introduction
1.1 To Cut a Cake
The topic of cake cutting is a subset of fair division, having its origins in recreational
mathematics. It is the problem of dividing a resource between a number of agents in a
fashion that is “fair”, be it a cake between children or zoning rights between property
developers.
What are the qualities of this resource? Well, a cake is not a bag of sweets. The
resource is continuous, and any given piece can be subdivided into smaller pieces. A
cake is not a mousse. The resource is heterogeneous, different agents can attach different
values to different regions of cake. Finally, a cake is not meant to be eaten alone. No
agent has exclusive right to the cake; it is a windfall good, its origin unimportant. We
have a cake, and we must cut it.
To effect the division of the cake we need more than a kitchen knife. If there is any
hope that the resulting allocation is to have the properties we desire of it, we need a
mechanism: a clearly specified set of rules that incorporates whatever information it
can evoke from the agents to find an allocation that best satisfies whatever criteria we
require of it.
1.2 Outline of this Work
In Section 2 we introduce the mathematical framework in which we will work throughout
the text. Section 3 we review the existing cake cutting literature, focusing on mechanisms
and their properties. In Section 4 we look at the efficiency of allocations, and show that
in general optimal allocations cannot be produced by any cake cutting mechanism. Part
of this problem stems from the strategic behaviour of agents, so in Section 5 we will
consider the equilibria induced by such in a restricted preferences model of cake cutting.
We conclude in Section 6.
Appendix A summaries all mechanisms mentioned in this text and Appendix B gives
pseudocode presentations of the Robertson-Webb protocols.
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1.2.1 Our Contribution
Our main result is that the cake cutting mechanism of [CLPP10] attains an allocation
that is undominated in terms of utilitarian efficiency. We achieve this with the help of
a game whose equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to the mechanism’s outcomes, which
better allows us to isolate the desired property.
2
2 A Framework for Cake Cutting
Problems in cake cutting have been approached by authors from Mathematics, Eco-
nomics, Computer and Political Science. As such terminology is not standard; different
papers use different terms to refer to the same concepts and sometimes the same terms
to different concepts. We will therefore dedicate this section to introducing notation and
definitions as they will be used in this text, which will allow us to use the same language
throughout the literature review in Section 3.
2.1 The Cake Cutting Situation
Central to cake cutting is, of course, the cake. In general we take the cake to be the unit
interval, [0, 1], although we shall touch upon the slightly different context of pie cutting
in Section 3.4. Cakes of higher dimensions do arise in the literature, but that is beyond
the scope of the current work.
A cake cutting situation consists of the cake and a finite number of agents. If the
number of agents is not explicitly specified, we will reserve n for the number of agents.
Every agent has a utility function on subsets of cake. We denote agent i’s utility function
by ui. We require that ui be:
• Normalised: ui([0, 1]) = 1.
• Countably additive: ui(X ∪ Y ) = ui(X) + ui(Y ), where X and Y are disjoint.
• Non-atomic: ui([a, a]) = 0.
• Non-negative: ui(X) ≥ 0.
These requirements are standard. Occasionally (for instance, in [Su99]) an additional
“hungry agents” condition is required:
• Non-zero: ui(X) = 0 only if X has zero measure.
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Formally, we require that ui be a probability measure defined on a σ-algebra of
subsets of the cake. That is:
ui([a, b]) =
∫ b
a
ti(x) dx (2.1)
for a probability density function ti. It should be noted that many papers on the sub-
ject do not make this explicit. For most purposes the exact form of the function is
unimportant, it is sufficient that it satisfies the first four conditions above and that the
agents are able to respond to certain queries regarding their utility; we shall encounter
this when we define Robertson-Webb protocols. Authors that do give definitions tend to
give conflicting ones. [Woo80], like us, defines a utility function as given by a probability
measure, while in [DS61] any countably additive real valued function suffices.
A slice of cake refers to a continuous sub-interval of [0, 1]. Non-atomicity of utility
functions allows us to assume that all slices are closed. A portion is a union of one
or more slices such that any two portions are disjoint, with the possible exception of
boundary points. An n-tuple of portions, A = (A1, ..., An), is an allocation, with portion
Ai being allocation to agent i. Agent i thus derives ui(Ai) utility from allocation A.
As slices and portions will be of greater interest to us than any other subset of cake,
we will use |X| to refer to the length, rather than the cardinality, of X. That is:
• |[a, b]| = b− a
• |X ∪ Y | = |X|+ |Y |, for disjoint X, Y .
If at any point we wish to refer to the cardinality of set X, we will use #X.
2.1.1 Restricted Preferences
While an arbitrary real valued density function is sufficient for many results in cake cut-
ting, it leads to problems from the computational side. Almost all such functions have no
finite representation (as there are uncountably many such functions, but only countably
many representations), and accordingly many associated problems are uncomputable.
One way to circumvent such issues is to restrict the range of admissible functions.
Three such restricted functions, as used in [CLPP10] and [CLPP11], are given below:
• Piecewise uniform: the cake can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals
such that for some constant c, ti(x) = c or 0 over every interval. As utilities are
normalised, c = 1/|Pi| where |Pi| is the total length of the cake that agent i has
non-zero density over. For computational purposes, we require that the endpoints
of these intervals be rational numbers.
• Piecewise constant: the cake can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals
such that ti is constant over every interval. In other words, ti is an arbitrary nor-
malised step function. For computational purposes, we require that the endpoints
of the intervals and the values of ti be rational numbers.
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• Piecewise linear: the cake can be partitioned into a finite number of intervals such
that ti is a linear function over every interval. For computational purposes, we
require that the endpoints of the intervals, slopes and y-intercepts of ti be rational
numbers.
Note that to specify piecewise uniform preferences it is sufficient to specify which
intervals of the cake the agent has non-zero density over. In other words, the intervals
the agent values. Due to this representational ease, we will often use piecewise uniform
preferences in examples.
2.2 Properties of Allocations
As the term “fair division” suggests, an underlying motivation of cake cutting is the
desire to cut the cake in some way that is “fair”. To speak formally of fairness, we need
to define notions of equity. Taking A = (A1, ..., An) as an allocation, we give three of
the more prominent definitions here.
• Proportionality: ui(Ai) ≥ 1/n for all i.
• Envy Freeness: ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj) for all i, j.
• Equitability: ui(Ai) = uj(Aj) for all i, j.
In words, a proportional allocation ensures each of n agents feels that they received
at least 1/nth of the cake. An envy free allocation ensures that no agent likes the portion
of another agent more than their own. Equitability ensures all agents derive the same
utility from the allocation.
Example 1. Given an allocation, we can visualise the equity criteria via an n×n table.
For instance, if n = 3 we construct:
A1 A2 A3
u1 u1(A1) u1(A2) u1(A3)
u2 u2(A1) u2(A2) u2(A3)
u3 u3(A1) u3(A2) u3(A3)
The diagonal is precisely the utilities derived from A. Hence if all entries are at least
1/n, A is proportional. If the entries in the diagonal are greater than or equal to all
other entries in their row, A is envy free. If all the entries in the diagonal are equal, A
is equitable.
The reader may note that in any cake cutting situation a trivial envy free allocation
is just E = (∅, ..., ∅). That is, envy can be eliminated by throwing the cake away. It
would however be difficult to defend such a manner of attaining equity. As such in
addition to equity criteria, certain concepts of efficiency are beneficial.
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• Non-wastefulness: for every interval I, if ui(I) = 0 then I ⊆ Ai only if uj(I) = 0
for all j.
• Pareto efficiency: there is no allocation B = (B1, ..., Bn) such that ui(Ai) ≤ ui(Bi)
for all i and uj(Aj) < uj(Bj) for some j.
• Utilitarian optimality: there is no allocation with a higher utilitarian efficiency
than A. That is:
n∑
i=1
ui(Ai) ≥
n∑
i=1
ui(Bi) (2.2)
for all allocations B.
Observe that the equity criteria do not, in general, imply each other. Consider these
three examples:
Example 2. Consider three agents with piecewise uniform preferences. Agent one
values [0, 0.1]. Agent two and three both value [0.4, 1]. We construct the allocation
(A1, A2, A3) = ([0, 0.1], [0.4, 0.8], [0.8, 1]). In other words:
A1 A2 A3
u1 1 0 0
u2 0 2/3 1/3
u3 0 2/3 1/3
This allocation is proportional as all the entries in the diagonal are greater than or equal
to 1/3. It is not envy free because u3(A2) > u3(A3): that is, agent 3 envies agent 2. It
is not equitable as the entries in the diagonal are not equal.
Example 3. Consider two agents with piecewise uniform preferences. Agent one values
[0, 0.5], agent two values [0.5, 1]. We construct the allocation (A1, A2) = (∅, [0.5, 1]).
A1 A2
u1 0 0
u2 0 1
The allocation is envy free, as the diagonal entries are the maxima of their respective
rows. It is not proportional as u1(A1) < 1/2. It is not equitable as u1(A1) 6= u2(A2).
Example 4. Consider two agents with piecewise uniform preferences. Agent one values
[0, 0.6], agent two values [0.4, 1]. We construct the allocation (A1, A2) = ([0.5, 1], [0, 0.5])
A1 A2
u1 1/6 5/6
u2 5/6 1/6
The allocation is equitable, as u1(A1) = u2(A2), but it is neither envy free nor propor-
tional.
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On the other hand, the efficiency criteria are of increasing strength.
Claim 1. An allocation is utilitarian optimal only if it is Pareto efficent and an allocation
is Pareto efficient only if it is non-wasteful.
Proof. Suppose an allocation A is utilitarian optimal but not Pareto efficient. Then
there exists an allocation B such that ui(Ai) ≤ ui(Bi) for all i and uj(Aj) < u(Bj) for
some j. But then: ∑
i 6=j
ui(Ai) ≤
∑
i 6=j
ui(Bi) (2.3)
uj(Aj) < uj(Bj) (2.4)
n∑
i=0
ui(Ai) <
n∑
i=0
ui(Bi) (2.5)
which is impossible because A is utilitarian optimal.
Suppose an allocation A is Pareto efficient but wasteful. That means for some i, j
there exists an interval I ⊆ Ai such that ui(I) = 0 but uj(I) > 0. But then we can attain
a Pareto dominant allocation by giving I to j, keeping everything else unchanged.
Finally, though in general the equity criteria are independent, that is not the case if
other requirements are imposed. A result that we will often implicitly invoke is that if
the entire cake is allocated, then envy freeness implies proportionality.
Claim 2. Given an allocation A, if:
n⋃
i=1
Ai = [0, 1] (2.6)
then A is envy free only if it is proportional.
Proof. Suppose A is not proportional. Then there exists some agent, i, such that
ui(Ai) < 1/n. Since utilities are additive and normalised,
∑
ui(Aj) > (n − 1)/n for
j 6= i. The average value of ui(Aj) is greater than 1/n and as utilities are non-negative,
there must exist some j such that ui(Aj) > 1/n > ui(Ai). Which is to say, agent i envies
this j.
2.3 Mechanisms
To obtain an allocation, we use a cake cutting mechanism. A cake cutting mechanism
is a game played by the agents, which effects a resulting allocation. We give no general
definition of a cake cutting mechanism: one would necessarily be too broad to be useful.
Instead we identify three classes of mechanisms and motivate them separately.
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2.3.1 Moving Knife Protocols
Some of the earliest cake cutting mechanisms, such as those proposed in [Aus82] and
[Str80], consist of one or more knives being moved continuously along the cake, stopping
when some player yells “cut!”. [DS61] say the following regarding these protocols:
“But their solution is more than a mere existence theorem. In fact, it provides
an important practical method for effecting such a division”
This is a rather curious feature of cake cutting. While more than an existence
theorem, a moving knife protocol is certainly less than an effective procedure in the
algorithmic sense: the continuous movement of the knife cannot be captured by a finite
protocol. Perhaps a close parallel are the Japanese and Dutch auctions; in theory price
is raised or lowered continuously until a winner is determined, while in any practical
application a discrete step size would have to be used, and the auction would only
approximate the continuous solution.
A moving knife protocol consists of a finite number of rules with clearly specified
rates and directions of movement, and rules for stopping the knives. An agent may be
asked to move a knife based on information from their own utility function: for instance,
in [Aus82] an agent is asked to move two knives such that the region between them is
worth a half of the cake in the agent’s estimation. However, an agent may not move a
knife based on another agent’s estimation, as this information is deemed to be private.
2.3.2 Robertson-Webb Protocols
Robertson-Webb protocols, so named after the authors of [RW98], offer a formalisation
that covers most finite cake cutting mechanisms. Agents are treated as oracles, able to
respond to the following two queries:
• eval(a,b): The agent evaluates the slice between a and b. That is, agent i returns
ui([a, b]).
• cut(a,x): The agent moves a knife from a to the right until they measure out a
slice they value at x. That is, agent i returns a b such that ui([a, b]) = x.
A Robertson-Webb protocol is thus an algorithmic procedure taking n agent oracles
as input and returning an allocation of the cake. Throughout the text we will present
Robertson-Webb protocols in a high level, natural language fashion. Pseudocode formu-
lations are included in Appendix B.
The elegance of this formulation is in its ability to circumvent the difficulties of
dealing with real valued functions. Agents can be assumed to be hypercomputational
entities if need be, able to manipulate their own utility function sufficiently to respond
to the two queries allowed by the mechanism. Whether or not their utilities have finite
representations is of no concern to the mechanism.
8
2.3.3 Revelation Protocols
There exist finite protocols, for instance in [CLPP11], [CLPP10] and [CLP11], which
cannot be represented as a Robertson-Webb protocol. Instead they take the form of
routines which take the agents’ utility functions as input (accordingly some finite rep-
resentation is required). As agents are required to directly submit their preferences to
the mechanism, these bear some resemblance to the direct revelation mechanisms of
implementation theory. We will thus refer to them as revelation protocols.
Formally, a revelation protocol is a function mapping (u1, ..., un) 7→ (A1, ..., An).
That is, it takes an n-tuple of utility functions to an allocation. This function is not
necessarily computable; we will in Section 3.6 see a mechanism for which no computable
implementation is known. Such mechanisms we call non-constructive to distinguish them
from mechanisms proper.
It may not be a priori obvious that it is not possible to simulate a revelation protocol
using a Robertson-Webb protocol. We claim that this is indeed the case, based on the
following observation:
Claim 3. There exist cake cutting situations with piecewise uniform preferences where
a Robertson-Webb protocol cannot create a non-wasteful allocation.
Proof. Consider a cake cutting situation with two agents where both agents value the
entire cake uniformly. A non-wasteful allocation in this case is any that allocates the
entire cake.
We will show that after a finite number of Robertson-Webb queries there exists a
different cake cutting situation that would generate the same responses to all the queries,
but where some agent, without loss of generality 1, does not value the entire cake.
Suppose a finite number of eval and cut queries has been made. In order to construct
the different situation we wish to divide the cake into intervals. These will be determined
by the queries made.
Place a mark on the cake at 0 and 1, all a, b for every eval(a,b) query to agent 1
and all a, b for every cut(a,x) query for agent 1 that returns b. Our desired intervals
are between consecutive marks thus placed. We refer to them as pieces.
For every piece, [i, j], in our new situation agent 1 will value [i, p] ∪ [q, j] such that
|[i, p] ∪ [q, j]| = |[i, j]|/c for some c > 1. We refer to all [p, q] so defined as holes.
We claim that the eval queries return the same values: every interval [a, b] evaluated
this way will consist of a finite number of pieces. We reduced the length of valued cake
in every piece by a factor of 1/c, so the length of valued cake in [a, b] will be reduced
by the same factor. As pieces cover the entire cake, the total length of valued cake is
likewise reduced by a factor of 1/c. As the utility derived from a slice of cake with
piecewise uniform preferences is just the length of valued cake in the slice divided by the
total length of valued cake, eval must return the same value.
We claim that the cut queries return the same values: every slice marked by a query
consists of a finite number of pieces, and we have already seen that the utility derived
from the pieces is the same in both situations.
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Now suppose agent 1 is allocated A1 by the mechanism. If A1 has a hole in it, then
this allocation is wasteful. If A1 does not have a hole in it, then we can replace agent 1
with 2 in the above construction. Agent 2 is allocated [0, 1]\A1, which must then have
a hole in it, thus creating waste.
In other words, a Robertson-Webb protocol cannot find the breakpoints between
intervals an agent values and intervals an agent does not. No such problems occur with
a revelation protocol, as agents simply submit these breakpoints to the mechanism.
On the other hand revelation protocols cannot, in general, be said to be stronger
than Robertson-Webb protocols. If agents’ preferences have some finite representation
then indeed we can simulate a Robertson-Webb protocol with a revelation protocol,
but if we do not have this guarantee then we cannot run a revelation protocol, while a
Robertson-Webb protocol functions equally well.
2.3.4 Behavioural Assumptions
A mechanism is a game, and games offer players a choice of strategies to maximise
their utility. In the case of moving knife protocols, how to stop or move the knife. For
Robertson-Webb protocols, whether to respond to the queries sincerely or otherwise. For
revelation protocols, to submit one’s actual utility function or some other which may
result in a preferable outcome.
The allocations produced by a mechanism, therefore, must be understood in terms
of the behaviour the mechanism expects from the agents. A weakly truthful envy free
mechanism faced with fully strategic agents may no longer produce envy free allocations.
We identify three classes of mechanism in the literature.
• Na¨ıve mechanism: Agents are assumed to be sincere. When we say a na¨ıve mech-
anism creates an allocation A, we mean that A is the outcome if all the agents
follow exactly the rules specified by the mechanism.
• Weakly truthful mechanism: Weak truthfulness was the norm in classical cake
cutting mechanisms. The concept is aptly explained in [Ste48]:
“It is easy to prove that the methods explained here secure to every
partner at least a part equal in value to the 1/nth of the whole. The
greed, the ignorance, and the envy of other partners can not deprive
him of the part due to him in his estimation; he has only to keep to the
methods described above. Even a conspiracy of all other partners with
the only aim to wrong him, even against their own interests, could not
damage him.”
A weakly truthful mechanism, therefore, is one that guarantees every agent a
strategy that will secure them either a proportional or an envy free portion, regard-
less of the strategies chosen by other agents. Weak truthfulness has little meaning
outside of proportional or envy free mechanisms: equitability and the efficiency
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criteria are essentially global, it makes no sense to say an agent is guaranteed an
equitable portion regardless of the portions of others.
The behaviour that is expected by weakly truthful mechanisms, therefore, is one of
extreme risk aversion. Agents will deviate from sincerity if they can do so without
risk, but failing that will stick to the guaranteed proportional/envy free portion
provided by the mechanism.
• Truthful mechanism: These are a recent development in cake cutting and of-
fer strategy-proofness in the conventional sense - sincerity is a weakly dominant
strategy, and an agent can never increase their expected utility by submitting an
insincere strategy.
The first and last category is relatively sparse, both appearing in rather recent papers.
The better part of the mechanisms we will survey are weakly truthful, so we will take
it as given in Section 3 that if the behavioural assumptions of a mechanism are not
explicitly specified, the mechanism is weakly truthful.
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3 Literature Review
We present an overview of the historical developments in cake cutting. In many ways
the core area in cake cutting was the development of mechanisms to procure envy free
allocations and we look at the main results of this in Section 3.2. Subsequent sections
examine selected themes, mainly those pertinent to efficiency or strategy. To motivate
the subject, we look at a prehistoric fair division protocol and a generalisation of it
presented in [Ste48].
3.1 Origins
While the modern treatment of cake cutting can be traced from the middle 20th century,
problems of fair division predate recorded history. Humans are social beings, sensitive
to issues of equity, and means of ensuring it have been around as long as we have. In
particular, our first mechanism is certainly too ancient to be attributed authorship.
Mechanism 1 (Cut and Choose). Given two agents, agent 1 cuts the cake into two
slices, X and Y such that u1(X) = u1(Y ). Agent 2 gets assigned a slice of their choice
and agent 1 gets assigned the remaining slice.
Proposition 1. Cut and Choose produces an envy free and proportional allocation.
Proof. For envy freeness, observe that agent 1 cannot be envious because u1(X) = u1(Y ).
Agent 2 cannot be envious because if u2(X) > u2(Y ) then they would choose and be
assigned X, if u2(Y ) > u2(X) they would choose and be assigned Y .
For proportionality, we invoke claim 2.
The idea behind Cut and Choose is simple. Agent 1 is not envious because they
effect the allocation in such a manner that they are indifferent between any permutation
of the portions, agent 2 is not envious because they determine which permutation is
allocated.
Letting one agent choose which possible world to be in is a intuitively appealing way
of eliminating envy for that particular agent. This approach has been known as far back
as Hesiod:
‘Son of Iapetus, most glorious of all lords, good sir, how unfairly you have
divided the portions!’
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So said Zeus whose wisdom is everlasting, rebuking him. But wily Prometh-
eus answered him, smiling softly and not forgetting his cunning trick:
‘Zeus, most glorious and greatest of the eternal gods, take which ever of these
portions your heart within you bids.’1
As simple as the mechanism is, the strategic implications of Prometheus’ “cunning
trick” illustrate well the distinction between the behaviour expected by truthful and
weakly truthful mechanisms.
Cut and Choose is a weakly truthful mechanism. Regardless of the behaviour of
agent 2, agent 1 can secure an envy free outcome for themselves by following the rules of
the mechanism: if u1(X) = u1(Y ), agent 1 is indifferent between the possible allocations.
Likewise, no matter how agent 1 cuts the cake, agent 2 gets to pick the piece they value
most, hence they have no reason to envy the other agent.
However, truthful behaviour is not a dominant strategy for agent 1. If agent 1
behaves sincerely they derive 1/2 utility from the allocation, while if u2(X) 6= u2(Y )
agent 2 will attain more than 1/2. That is not to say agent 1 has the short end of the
stick, however. By anticipating the decision of agent 2, agent 1 can cut the cake so that
u2(X) = u2(Y ) +  and u1(X) < u1(Y ), agent 2 will pick slice X for slightly more than
1/2 utility, whereas agent 1 gets slice Y which they value more than the 1/2 they would
have received had they acted sincerely. [KS02] dedicates a section to the behaviour of an
expected utility maximising agent under different information assumptions in the Cut
and Choose scenario.
On the other hand, if agent 1 is fully strategic then Cut and Choose may fail to
produce an envy free allocation. If agent 1 has imperfect knowledge of agent 2’s utility,
then in trying to cut the cake so that u2(X) = u2(Y ) + , agent 1 may underestimate
u2(Y ) and agent 2 will pick Y , leaving agent 1 with X and envy of agent 2’s portion.
We thus reiterate the remark at the end of Section 2.3.4 that throughout the literature
review if the behavioural assumptions of a mechanism are not specified, it is taken to be
weakly truthful.
During the 1940s Steinhaus, Banach and Knaster sought to extend the Cut and
Choose mechanism to an arbitrary number of agents. In [Ste48] they present a propor-
tional mechanism for n agents:
Mechanism 2 (Last Diminisher). Given n agents, the first agent cuts a slice X such
that u1(X) = 1/n. If there exists an agent i such that ui(X) > 1/n, agent i trims X
into X ′ such that ui(X ′) = 1/n. The trimmings are returned to the cake. The process
continues until no such i exists. The trimmed slice is allocated to the last agent to trim
it, and the procedure recurses on the remaining agents and the remaining cake.
Proposition 2. Last Diminisher produces a proportional allocation.
Proof. It is clear that if an agent is allocated a slice, they perceive that slice to be at
least 1/n of the cake. It remains to show that the mechanism can always make such an
1Theogony, ll. 543-558. Translated by Hugh G. Evelyn-White.
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allocation. That is, after i agents have been allocated, the remaining cake is perceived to
be at least (n− i)/n of the original by the remaining agents. We proceed by induction.
Base case: without loss of generality, relabel the agents such that 1 be the first agent
to be allocated a slice. Let X be the slice allocated to 1. We claim that uj(X) ≤ 1/n for
all j. Assume otherwise: that is, for some j, uj(X) > 1/n. Then abiding by the rules
of the protocol, j would have trimmed X to some smaller X ′ such that uj(X ′) = 1/n,
and j would have been allocated the first slice instead of 1. As such, by the additivity
of utility functions, uj([0, 1]\X) ≥ (n− 1)/n for all remaining j.
Inductive case: relabel the agents such that 1, ..., i are the first i agents to be allocated
a slice. By the inductive hypothesis, uj(R) ≥ (n− i)/n for j /∈ {1, ..., i} where R is the
remaining cake. Let i+ 1 be the next agent to be allocated a slice. Call it X. Observe
that uj(X) ≤ 1/n for all j /∈ {1, ..., i} by the same argument as before. So by additivity,
uj(R\X) ≥ (n− i− 1)/n for all remaining j.
We have thus established that for any i, the remaining n−i agents view the remaining
cake as at least (n−i)/n of the original cake. As such the mechanism can always allocate
an agent a slice they perceive to be at least 1/n of the cake.
Unfortunately, this mechanism fails to be envy free. While an agent can never envy
those who have been allocated before them, it is entirely possible for them to envy some
agent that gets allocated a slice later in the protocol.
Example 5. Consider three agents with piecewise uniform preferences. Agent 1 values
the entire cake, agent 2 values [2/5, 1], agent 3 values [4/5, 1]. Agent 1 will be allocated
[0, 1/3] first, then agent 2 [5/15, 9/15], and agent 3 the remaining [9/15, 1].
A1 A2 A3
u1 1/3 4/15 2/5
u2 0 1/3 2/3
u3 0 0 1
So agents 1 and 2 envy 3. The envy of 2 towards 3 could be eliminated by using Cut
and Choose once only two agents remain, but agent 1 would still envy 3.
As it turns out, the problem of finding envy free allocations is far more difficult.
3.2 Envy Free Protocols
To avoid dealing with uninteresting cases, for the duration of this section we will only
consider mechanisms that allocate the entire cake, as this prevents the empty allocation
from being a solution.
An envy free protocol for the three agent case was discovered by Selfridge, first
published in [Woo80].
Mechanism 3 (Selfridge’s Algorithm). Agent 1 cuts the cake into slices X,Y, Z such
that u1(X) = u1(Y ) = u1(Z). Without loss of generality, we can relabel the slices
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such that u2(X) ≥ u2(Y ) ≥ u2(Z). Agent 2 trims slice X into X ′ and T such that
u2(X
′) = u2(Y ). Agent 3 picks whichever of X ′, Y and Z they prefer, agent 1 picks one
of the two remaining and agent 2 gets the last slice. It remains to divide T .
There are two cases in the division of T . If agent 1 chose slice X ′ then T is divided
between 2 and 3 using Cut and Choose.
Otherwise let whichever of 2 and 3 chose slice X ′ be x and the other y. Agent y cuts
T into U, V,W such that uy(U) = uy(V ) = uy(W ). Agent x picks whichever slice they
prefer, 1 picks from the remaining two and y is allocated the last slice.
Proposition 3 ([Woo80]). Selfridge’s Algorithm produces an envy free allocation.
It pays to note that while we have defined slices as distinct from portions, thus far
the two notions have been used interchangeably. Selfridge’s Algorithm is the first we
cover where an agents’ portion consists of more than one slice. As it turns out, this is not
coincidental. While proportional mechanisms can and do allocate contiguous intervals
to agents, envy free Robertson-Webb protocols need necessarily fragment the portions.
Theorem 1 ([Str08]). A Robertson-Webb protocol cannot produce an envy free allocation
for more than two agents if the agents’ portions consist of a single slice each.
The above theorem hinges on the nature of such mechanisms, not of the nature of
the cake. In fact, envy free allocations where portions consist of single slices always
exist ([Str80]). This is not the first time we will run into mathematical existence and
algorithmic impossibility: this should not be surprising as measure theory lives among
the Reals, while algorithmics with the Integers. If we allow the mechanism to be non-
algorithmic, there is no impossibility. In the same paper, a continuous mechanism is
presented to effect such an allocation for three agents:
Mechanism 4 (Four Knives). A sword is moved continuously left to right across the
cake, dividing it into left and right slices, X and Y . Three agents move knives across Y
such that each agents’ knife splits Y into what they consider two even slices, Y1 on the
left and Y2 on the right. Whenever ui(X) = 1/3, agent i yells “cut!”. The cake is cut by
the sword and the middle knife, splitting it into X, Y1 and Y2. Agent i receives X. If
the agent whose knife is nearest to the sword is not i, they take Y1. If the agent whose
knife is farthest from the sword is not i, they take Y2. If the agent whose knife cut the
cake is not i, they take whichever slice is left over.
Proposition 4 ([Str80]). Four Knives produces an envy free allocation.
Neither of these two mechanisms generalise to larger numbers of agents as Last
Diminisher did. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that the proportionality of the
portions allocated thus far will not be affected by whatever allocations the mechanism
may make in the future. Once an agent is allocated a portion they perceive to be worth
at least 1/n, whatever portions the other agents receive will not alter the fact that the
agent’s portion is a proportional one. This is not the case with envy free procedures;
envy can rear its head at any stage of the allocation.
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One approach to this difficulty draws on a moving knife procedure of [Aus82] that
allows two agents to find an allocation where both agents consider either piece to be
worth half the cake - what is called a perfect allocation, a concept to which we will
return in Section 3.6.
Mechanism 5 (Austin’s Scheme). A knife is moved from the left across the cake,
separating it into X and Y . When ui(X) = 1/2, agent i yells “stop”. Agent i takes
the knife, adds a new knife to the left edge of the cake and moves the two knives across
in such a manner such that the region between the knives is always 1/2 of the cake in
i’s estimation. When the region outside the knives is worth 1/2 in the second agent’s
estimation, that agent yells “stop”. i gets the slice between the knives and the other
agent gets the rest of the cake.
Proposition 5 ([Aus82]). Austin’s Scheme produces a perfect allocation.
By iterating Austin’s Scheme one can cut the cake into 2m slices such that agents
1 and 2 think all slices are worth the same. This idea is used by [BTZ97] to create an
envy free moving knife mechanism for four agents.
Mechanism 6 (Four Agent Moving Knife). Agents 1 and 2 use Austin’s Scheme to cut
the cake into U and V , then use Austin’s Scheme on U and V to end up with four slices,
X,Y, Z,W , such that 1 and 2 consider each of the slices to be 1/4 of the entire cake.
Agent 3 trims the most valuable slice in their estimation, without loss of generality X,
into X ′ such that there exists a tie between X ′ and the second most valuable slice.
Agent 4 picks the slice they value most. If agent 4 did not pick X ′, agent 3 is
allocated X ′. Otherwise, agent 3 picks the slice they value most. Agents 1 and 2 pick
the remaining slices in any order. It remains to divide the trimmings.
Rename agents 3 and 4 into x and y where x is the agent that picked X ′. Agent y
and 2 use Austin’s Scheme on the trimmings to divide it into four slices they consider
to be all worth the same, T1, T2, T3 and T4. Agent x picks a slice of their choice, then
1, then y, then 2.
Proposition 6 ([BTZ97]). Four Agent Moving Knife produces an envy free allocation.
What allows the mechanism to divide the trimmings without generating envy is that
agents 1 and 2 have an “irrevocable advantage” over the player that chose X ′. Even if
that player were to be allocated the entirety of the trimming, 1 and 2 would not envy
that player because that would only bring their portion back up to X, which 1 and 2
value as much as their own.
[BT95] capitalise on the idea of irrevocable advantage to create an envy free mech-
anism for any number of agents. Unfortunately the details of the mechanism are too
complex to give here. The general procedure involves having one agent cut the cake into
n slices they consider equal, and a preliminary allocation of these slices made. Whenever
this creates envy, a subroutine is run between the envied and the envier until the envier
has an irrevocable advantage over the envied.
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This mechanism is guaranteed to produce an envy free allocation in a finite number
of steps, but this number is unbounded: for any c there exists a cake cutting situation
in which the mechanism will run for more than c steps. No bounded Robertson-Webb
protocol for four or more agents is known.
3.2.1 Summary
The mechanisms presented in this section do not represent the entirety of the envy free
cake cutting literature, but they do cover all cases for which a solution is known.
Robertson-Webb Moving knife
2 agents Cut and Choose [Aus82]
3 agents Selfridge, presented in [Woo80] [Str80]
4 agents [BT95] (unbounded) [BTZ97]
5 or more [BT95] (unbounded) None known
Note that we did not cover any revelation protocols: these require that the agents
have finitely representable utility functions and the core areas of cake cutting do not
allow that assumption.
To date no bounded protocol, Robertson-Webb or moving knife, is known for five
or more agents. While we did not explicitly state so, the reader can easily verify that
all mechanisms presents before that of [BT95] do terminate in a bounded number of
“steps”: queries in the case of Robertson-Webb protocols, cuts in the case of moving
knife mechanisms. However the fact that this fails in [BT95] suggests that the query
and cut complexity of mechanisms may be interesting in its own right. We examine this
in the next section.
3.3 Query Complexity
The standard approach to measuring the complexity of procedures in Computer Science
is to bound the growth of the running time with respect to the input. To do so in the
context of cake cutting, we need a procedure that can run on an arbitrary number of
agents. We have already seen such a procedure in Mechanism 2: Last Diminisher. A
natural starting point is to inquire as to the complexity of this mechanism.
Claim 4. The query complexity of Last Diminisher is O(n2).
Proof. The reader may find the pseudocode formulation in Appendix B helpful.
There is a nested loop at play here: we have one agent cut a slice of cake, then all the
remaining agents evaluate and possibly trim the slice. For every agent allocated we thus
have at worst 2n queries, and as we allocate n agents the upper bound is O(n2).
[EP84] improve on this bound. They present a proportional mechanism that takes
O(n log n) queries.
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Mechanism 7. Have every agent mark the midpoint, rounding down in the case of an
odd number of agents, of the cake in their own valuation. That is, agent i marks mi
such that ui([0,mi])/ui([mi, 1]) = bn+1c/dn+1e. Observe that such an mi is just a real
number, so we can define ≺ as follows: if mi < mj set mi ≺ mj , if mi = mj break the
tie arbitrarily. Let mj be the bn/2cth mark in this order. Recurse on two subroutines:
one with agents i for mi  mj and cake [0,mj ] and the other on agents i for mj ≺ mi
and cake [mj , 1].
If only one agent is left in a subroutine, allocate them all the cake in the subroutine.
Proposition 7 ([EP84]). Mechanism 7 takes O(n log n) queries and produces a propor-
tional allocation.
As it turns out this is the best we can do. While in the same paper [EP84] present
a randomised protocol that takes O(n) cuts on average, as far as worst case complexity
goes a lower bound was proven by [EP06].
Proposition 8 ([EP06]). The lower bound on the query complexity of proportional
Robertson-Webb mechanisms is Ω(n log n).
Given Mechanism 7, this bound is clearly tight.
A lower bound for envy free mechanisms was given in [Pro09]. However as thus far
no bounded, n-agent envy free procedures are known, the actual bound may well be
higher.
Proposition 9 ([Pro09]). The lower bound on the query complexity of any envy free
Robertson-Webb mechanism is Ω(n2).
3.4 Cutting Pies
The distinction between cakes and pies, in the eyes of a mathematician, is that cakes
are square and pies are round. A pie is then identified with [0, 1] where 0 and 1 are
topologically identical. That is to say, [0.9, 0.1] is a slice of pie, but not of cake.
Note that if we allow portions to consist of any number of slices, there is no difference
between the two problems. [0.9, 0.1] may not be a slice, but [0.9, 1] ∪ [0, 0.1] is clearly a
portion, and given additive utilities it is valued the same. In this section, then, we take
it that a portion can consist of only one slice.
Pies are of interest to us primarily because of two impossibility results.
Proposition 10 ([Str07],[Tho07]). There exist pie cutting situations where no allocation
is both envy free and Pareto efficient.
Proposition 11 ([Tho07]). Truthful pie cutting mechanisms cannot produce Pareto
efficient allocations.
To this point we have dealt solely with the equity side of the problem, so it is interest-
ing that Proposition 10 suggests that issues of efficiency may be more closely intertwined
with equity than first apparent. Proposition 11 hints that there are difficulties involved
in inducing truthful behaviour, which we shall return to in Section 4.
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3.5 The Price of Fairness
An important concept in Economics is the tradeoff between equity and efficiency. Cake
cutting is no different, and the efficiency loss imposed by our equity criteria has been
studied in [CKKK09] and [AD10]. The first paper is connected with utilitarian efficiency
only, the second introduces the notion of egalitarian efficiency:
UE(A) =
n∑
i=1
ui(Ai) (3.1)
EE(A) = min
i
ui(Ai) (3.2)
The authors define the price of proportionality (respectively: envy freeness and equit-
ability) with respect to utilitarian efficiency (respectively: egalitarian) to be the ratio
of the utilitarian optimum to the proportional allocation with the highest utilitarian
efficiency. The reader will note that this value will be different in different cake cutting
situations. We are typically interested in the worst case: that is, the highest possible
value of this instance. By picking extreme situations, therefore, this allows one to place
bounds on the price of these criteria. We will present a result of [CKKK09] to demon-
strate this procedure.
Proposition 12 ([CKKK09]). The price of proportionality is at least
√
n/2.
Proof. Consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform preferences, where n is a
square. That is, n = m2 for some m ∈ N. For i ∈ {1, ...,m}, i values [ i−1m , im ]. All other
agents value the entire cake uniformly. One can verify that the utilitarian optimum
would involve allocating [ i−1m ,
i
m ] to i, and nothing to i /∈ {1, ...,m}. The utilitarian
efficiency of this allocation is m =
√
n.
Next, consider a proportional allocation. In order to maximise utilitarian efficiency
we should minimise the amount of cake we give to agents i /∈ {1, ...,m}. The least we
could give each is 1/n of the cake, which would yield (n−√n) · 1/n = n−
√
n
n efficiency.
For a large enough n this is close to 1. This will leave us with 1/m of the cake to divide
between the first m agents. No means of doing this can give us more than 1 efficiency,
so the total utilitarian efficiency is at most 2.
The price of proportionality, therefore, is bounded below by
√
n/2.
We summarise their results in a table:
Price of: Proportionality Envy freeness Equitability
Countable portions UE At least: √n/2 √n/2 (n+ 1)2/4n
[CKKK09] At most: 2
√
n− 1 n− 1/2 n
Single slice portions UE At least: √n/2 √n/2 n− 1 + 1/n
[AD10] At most:
√
n/2 + 1
√
n/2 + 1 n
EE 1 n/2 1
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3.6 Truthful Mechanisms
The treatment of fully strategic behaviour in the literature is a recent development.
Aside from the results of [Tho07] in the context of pies, there are two papers on the
subject, giving us two mechanisms, one of which is non-constructive. Both of these are
revelation protocols, thus require the additional assumption that agents’ preferences have
some finite representation. In the case of Mechanism 9 this is guaranteed by piecewise
uniform preferences, while in Mechanism 8 one must bear in mind that the mechanism
may not function on an arbitrary cake cutting situation.
The non-constructive mechanism, discovered independently by [CLPP10] and [MT10],
relies on the concept of a perfect allocation.
Definition 1. An allocation A is perfect if ui(Aj) = 1/n for all i, j. That is, every agent
thinks every slice is exactly 1/n of the cake.
Using our previous means of a table to visualise an equity criteria, a perfect allocation
is where all the entries in the table are 1/n.
A1 · · · An
u1 1/n · · · 1/n
...
...
. . .
...
un 1/n · · · 1/n
A result of [Alo87] guarantees the existence of perfect allocations. However this result
is purely existential. In fact, such an allocation cannot be attained by a Robertson-Webb
protocol, even for two agents [RW97]. If we could find such an allocation, however, we
could use the following mechanism:
Mechanism 8. Given the agents’ preferences, construct a perfect partition, (pi1, ..., pin).
Randomly assign pii to some agent. Remove that agent and recurse on the remaining
agents.
Proposition 13 ([CLPP10],[MT10]). Mechanism 8 is truthful in expectation and pro-
duces a perfect allocation.
Such a solution leaves much to be desired. Even the non-constructive nature aside,
the fact that this mechanism is only truthful in expectation means that it is not robust
enough to handle risk seeking agents: a single agent willing to take a gamble on the
outcome could submit an insincere utility function, thereby the partition constructed by
the mechanism would not be perfect at all, and could well lead to loss of envy freeness
and proportionality for the sincere agents.
Given piecewise uniform preferences, however, a deterministic mechanism which
avoids these difficulties exists.
Mechanism 9. Let A be a subset of agents and X a subset of the cake. Let D(A,X)
be all the intervals of X that are valued by at least one agent in A. Define:
avg(A,X) =
D(A,X)
#A
(3.3)
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An allocation is said to be exact with respect to A and X if it assigns to every agent in A
a portion of X of length avg(A,X) consisting only of the intervals that the agent values.
Given the set of agents A and the cake [0, 1], find A ⊆ A such that A minimises the
value of avg(A, [0, 1]). Produce an exact allocation with respect to A and [0, 1]. Recurse
on A\A and [0, 1]\D(A, [0, 1]).
Proposition 14. Mechanism 9 is truthful and produces an envy free allocation.
To date no extensions to more complicated preferences are known.
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4 Efficiency of Allocations
We examine the notions of utilitarian and egalitarian efficiency, asking what it means for
an allocation to be optimal in either of these measures. We place bounds on their values
and discuss the conditions for their existence. In both cases we demonstrate that such
allocations cannot, in general, be produced by cake cutting mechanisms if the agents are
allowed to be strategic.
4.1 Utilitarian Efficiency
We recall the notion of utilitarian efficiency:
UE(A) =
n∑
i=1
ui(Ai) (4.1)
A utilitarian optimal allocation is therefore one which attains the highest possible
utilitarian efficiency. It is easy to put bounds on this value, but due to the flexibility of
a cake cutting situation these aren’t very interesting:
Proposition 15. The utilitarian efficiency of a utilitarian optimal allocation is bounded
above by n, below by 1, and these bounds are tight.
Proof. For the upper bound, we observe that the maximum utility attained by any one
agent is 1 due to normalisation. A sum of n terms, each bounded by 1, is bounded by n.
To see that this bound is tight, consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform
preferences where agent i values [ i−1n ,
i
n ]. That is, all preferences are disjoint, so we can
allocate every agent a portion that they value as much as the entire cake.
For the lower bound, ui([0, 1]) = 1 for any i, so we can always give the entire cake
to one agent. To see that this is bound is tight, consider a cake cutting situation with
piecewise uniform preferences where all agents value the entire cake. That is the utility
derived from any portion by any agent is precisely the portion’s length, ui(Ai) = |Ai|.
As no allocation can allocate portions with combined length exceeding that of the cake,
the utilitarian efficiency cannot exceed 1.
Another simple, yet important, result concerns the existence of utilitarian optimal
allocations.
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Theorem 2. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a utilitarian op-
timal allocation is that it be possible to divide the cake into a finite number of slices, Si,
such that for all i, for some j, for every sub-interval S′i ⊆ Si, for all k, uj(S′i) ≥ uk(S′i).
Proof. Suppose this condition is not satisfied. Let A be any allocation. There must be
some slice, S, in some portion, Ai, such that for some sub-interval S
′ ⊆ S, uj(S′) > ui(S)
for some j. Then the allocation obtained by moving S′ to Aj and keeping all else equal
will have a higher utilitarian efficiency. As it is always possible to create an allocation
with a higher utilitarian efficiency, there can be no maximum.
Suppose this condition is satisfied. We claim that the allocation produced by alloc-
ating Si to the j so defined is optimal. Suppose otherwise. This would mean that it
is possible to improve on this allocation by giving the interval I ⊆ [0, 1] to some other
agent. We consider two cases.
Case one: I ⊆ Si for some i. In this case I is already allocated to a j such that
uj(I) ≥ uk(I) for all k. As preferences are additive, giving I to any other agent cannot
increase the utilitarian efficiency.
Case two:I ⊆ ⋃Si where i ∈ X for some X. We split I into Ii, such that Ii = I ∩Si.
Given additivity of preferences, allocating each Ii to the agent that values it most will
yield at least as much utility as allocating all of I to some agent. With Ii so defined, we
can return to case one.
Theorem 2 may seem to merely restate what a utilitarian optimal allocation is, rather
than provide the conditions for its existence. However this circumlocution is necessary,
and allows us to prove that cake cutting situations with piecewise linear preferences
always admit utilitarian optimal allocations.
Proposition 16. Given a cake cutting situation with piecewise linear preferences, a
utilitarian optimal allocation exists.
Proof. We will divide the cake into a finite number of slices, Si, satisfying the hypotheses
of Theorem 2.
Recall that with piecewise linear preferences, the cake can be partitioned into a
finite number of intervals such that ti is linear over every interval. We will refer to these
intervals as pieces. Mark a point on the cake wherever:
• A piece of some ti begins or ends, or
• ti(x) = tj(x) for i 6= j. That is, wherever the density functions of two agents
intersect.
Observe that this constitutes a finite number of marks: we have a finite number
pieces for each of a finite number of agents, and as ti is linear over every piece it can
only intersect other tj a finite number of times.
Let Si then be the slice between the ith and (i + 1)th mark, taking the mark at 0
to be the first. Observe that there exists a j such that tj |Si(x) ≥ tk|Si(x) for all k. For
if not, then either some tk must intersect tj over Si, or there are two pieces of tk in Si,
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such that over one piece tj is larger, over the other tk. But neither of these is possible,
because we placed marks at every intersection and every piece endpoint, so over every
slice we only have non-intersecting, linear functions.
As agent j’s density therefore is greater over all of Si, it is easy to see that for every
sub-interval S′i ⊆ Si, uj(S′i) ≥ uk(S′i).
Corollary 1. Given a cake cutting situation with piecewise constant or piecewise uni-
form preferences, a utilitarian optimal allocation exists.
Proof. Either of the two can easily be seen to be a special case of piecewise linear
preferences.
Piecewise linear preferences are extremely general and can be used to approximate a
wide range of utility functions, so it may well be the case that for every non-pathological
case a utilitarian optimum exists. However, the cake cutting framework is general enough
to admit pathologies where one does not. It is not terribly difficult to construct such
an example using density functions which oscillate an infinite number of times over the
unit interval.
Example 6. Consider a cake cutting situation with two agents, their density functions
given by t1(x) = α(sin(
x
1−x) + 1) with normalisation constant α ≈ 0.744391, and a
constant t2(x) = 1.
For any partition of the cake into a finite number of slices, we can always improve on
the allocation by splitting a slice on the right of the cake into two, and allocating each
to whichever agent derives more utility from it.
While an infinitely oscillating function is necessary for a counter example, it is not
sufficient. If we replace t2 in the above example with a piecewise defined:
t′2(x) =
{
0 : x ∈ [0, 0.5)
2 : x ∈ [0.5, 1] (4.2)
Then an optimum allocation clearly exists: give [0, 0.5] to agent 1, [0.5, 1] to agent 2.
The problem arises from the fact that in some situations we can always increase
efficiency by making a finer division of the cake. As such we speculate that the problem
would disappear if the agents’ portions were a fixed number of slices.
Conjecture 1. A utilitarian optimal allocation always exists in the context where the
agents’ portions are restricted to a constant c number of slices.
4.1.1 Non-Existence of Mechanisms
We round off our discussion of the utilitarian optimum by observing that such allocations
are, in general, unattainable.
A utilitarian optimal allocation will generally require a very precise partition of
the cake, and Robertson-Webb protocols cannot obtain enough information about the
agents’ utility functions to do so.
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Corollary 2. Robertson-Webb protocols cannot always produce utilitarian optimal al-
locations.
Proof. By Claim 3, Robertson-Webb protocols cannot always produce non-wasteful al-
locations, so by Claim 1 they cannot produce utilitarian optimal allocations.
More generally, a utilitarian optimum may be against the interests of individual
agents. As such it should be no surprise that mechanisms fail in the face of strategic
agents.
Claim 5. There is no cake cutting mechanism that attains a utilitarian optimal alloca-
tion in every cake cutting situation if the agents are strategic.
Proof. Consider two situations with three agents with piecewise uniform preferences. In
the first agent 1 values [0, 0.5], agent 2 [0.5, 1], agent 3 [0, 1]. In the second agent 1 values
[0, 0.5], agent 2 [0.5, 1], agent 3 [0.4, 0.6].
Observe that in the first situation the unique utilitarian optimal allocation is
A1 = ([0, 0.5], [0.5, 1], ∅) while in the second A2 = ([0, 0.4], [0.6, 1], [0.4, 0.6]).
Suppose a mechanism, given the second situation, produces A2. When faced with
the first situation, agents 1 and 2 have the same preferences as before, and as such will
respond to the mechanism in the same manner. Agent 3 has different preferences, but
that information is not available to the mechanism. As agent 3 derives more utility from
A2 than A1, they can pretend to value [0.4, 0.6] instead of [0, 1] and the mechanism would
be unable to distinguish between the two situations and would produce a suboptimal
allocation in one of the cases.
We can also show that there exists no mechanism that always attains a greater
or equal utilitarian efficiency than any other mechanism. This suggests that a better
candidate for the “best possible” mechanism may be one that is never dominated, rather
than one that always dominates - we return to this in Section 5.3.
Claim 6. There is no mechanism that in every cake cutting situation produces an alloca-
tion with utilitarian efficiency greater or equal to that produced by any other mechanism,
if the agents are strategic.
Proof. Take an arbitrary allocation, A, and consider the mechanism that always alloc-
ated A, regardless of the situation it is in. If A is non-empty, we can always find a
cake cutting situation in which A is actually utilitarian optimal, so the mechanism will
produce a utilitarian optimal allocation in at least one situation.
Clearly we can define such a mechanism for every possible allocation. If there existed
a mechanism that did at least as well as all of these, it would necessarily produce a
utilitarian optimal allocation in any cake cutting situation, but if the agents are strategic
this is impossible.
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4.2 Egalitarian Efficiency
Recall that egalitarian efficiency was defined in [AD10] as:
EE(A) = min
i
ui(Ai) (4.3)
As with utilitarian efficiency, we can define an egalitarian optimal allocation as one
which maximises this value and likewise prove bounds on it.
Proposition 17. The egalitarian efficiency of an egalitarian optimal allocation is bounded
above by 1, below by 1/n, and these bounds are tight.
Proof. It is easy to see that for any allocation A,
n · EE(A) ≤ UE(A) (4.4)
In particular, if A is utilitarian optimal then for any B,
n · EE(B) ≤ UE(A) (4.5)
as otherwise the utilitarian efficiency of B would have been higher than of A.
With Proposition 15, this immediately gives us the upper bound. To see that it is
tight, consider again the case of pairwise disjoint piecewise uniform preferences.
For the lower bound, we can create an allocation with egalitarian efficiency of at least
1/n by running Last Diminisher or any other proportional mechanism. To see that it is
tight, we invoke (4.5) and Proposition 15.
In both situations used in the proof, we in fact had a stronger relation than that
of (4.5). The egalitarian efficiency of the egalitarian optimum was equal to 1/n of the
utilitarian efficiency of the utilitarian optimum. One may ask if this is always the case.
The answer is no.
Example 7. Consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform preferences with
three agents where agents 1 values [0, 0.5], agent 2 values [0.5, 1] and agent 3 values the
cake uniformly. The unique utilitarian optimal allocation is ([0, 0.5], [0.5, 1], ∅), with util-
itarian efficiency of 2. The egalitarian optimum, however, is ([0, 0.25], [0.75, 1], [0.25, 0.75])
with egalitarian efficiency of only 1/2.
4.2.1 Non-Existence of Mechanisms
Observe that to attain an egalitarian efficiency higher than 1/n is to give every agent a
portion they value at more than 1/n of the cake. This coincides with an equity criterion
examined in [DS61].
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Definition 2. An allocation A is super proportional if ui(Ai) > 1/n for all i.
[DS61] prove the existence of super proportional allocations, provided at least two
agents have different utility functions. However [MT10] present an impossibility result
for attaining such allocations.
Proposition 18 ([MT10]). There is no mechanism that produces a super proportional
allocation in every cake cutting situation if the agents are strategic.
Corollary 3. There is no mechanism that produces an egalitarian optimal allocation in
every cake cutting situation if the agents are strategic.
Proof. If a situation has two agents with different utility functions, a super proportional
allocation exists. Any egalitarian optimum, therefore, must be super proportional.
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5 Strategic Cake Cutting
Motivated by the existence result of Proposition 16, we ask whether we can construct
mechanisms to find utilitarian optimal allocations in the simplest case - that of piecewise
uniform preferences. It turns out that as far as na¨ıve mechanisms go the problem is
trivial, which leads us to consider strategic behaviour.
5.1 Two Non-Wasteful Mechanisms
As we saw in Claim 1, a necessary condition for an allocation being utilitarian optimal
is it being non-wasteful. As such given Claim 3 we can exclude Robertson-Webb proto-
cols from consideration, and in the interests of keeping our mechanisms conventionally
computable we will also exclude moving knife protocols. This leaves us with revelation
protocols, which suits us well as given our definition of piecewise uniform preferences we
are guaranteed to have a finite representation: an agent need only submit the end points
of every interval they value.
Since for the duration of this section we restrict our attention to piecewise uni-
form preferences, we no longer need the generality of our previous definition of a util-
ity function. We will denote by Pi the preferences of agent i: that is, the union of
all the slices agent i values. A cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform then
is completely specified by the n-tuple (P1, ..., Pn). A mechanism will be a function
(S1, ..., Sn) 7→ (A1, ..., An), where Si is the strategy of agent i: a union of slices, not
necessarily equal to Pi. The utility an agent attains from an allocation can be seen to
be just:
ui(Ai) =
|Ai ∩ Pi|
|Pi| (5.1)
Non-wastefulness is not an onerous condition, but it is sufficient for the most obvious
of trivial solutions - give all the cake to one agent - to fail. If the agent does not value
the entire cake, there may be waste where they receive some slice from which they derive
no utility, but some other agent would have. We need to be a bit more sophisticated,
but not by much.
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Mechanism 10 (Lex Order). Form a linear order, ≺, over the agents. Allocate every
agent i:
Ai = Si\
⋃
j≺i
Sj (5.2)
In other words, Lex Order simply gives every agent what they asked for, minus what
was already given to agents coming earlier in the order. It’s easy to see that Lex Order
is a truthful mechanism: agents’ payoffs are determined solely by the order, which is
exogenous. Submitting some Si where |Pi\Si| 6= 0 would certainly not help agent i: it
will only reduce the chance of them getting some of the cake that they value. Submitting
some Si where |Si\Pi| 6= 0 likewise cannot increase their utility. However in this case
it cannot decrease it either. Being truthful in this respect is only weakly dominant.
Unfortunately pretending to value some of the cake that one does not can potentially
harm the welfare of other agents. If the first agent in the order claims to value [0, 1]
while they only value [0, 0.1] Lex order may no longer be non-wasteful. This leads us to
define a behavioural restriction.
Definition 3. Agents are said to be well behaved if Si ⊆ Pi for all i.
We will generally assume agents are well behaved. This involves the implicit as-
sumption that ceteris paribus, agents have a bias in favour of truthfulness and derive no
misanthropic pleasure from causing harm to others. If need be, this behaviour could be
enforced by, for instance, imposing an  cost on the length of an agent’s strategy. If  is
small enough it should not deter the agent from choosing a strongly dominant strategy if
one exists, but faced with multiple equivalent strategies will choose the smallest - which
would be in accord with well behavedness.
We observe that if one had some prior knowledge of the agents’ preferences, one could
easily construct ≺ such that Lex Order would produce a utilitarian optimal allocation:
simply order the agents by the length of their preferences. The question, then, is how
one should behave in the absence of such information. The obvious approach would be
to ask the agents, and that is what we will consider.
5.2 Length Game and its Equilibria
We modify Lex Order to construct ≺ based on the lengths of the agents’ strategies.
Mechanism 11 (Length Game). Form a linear order ≺, over the agents such that if
|Si| < |Sj |, i ≺ j. If |Si| = |Sj | order the two in any order. Allocate agent i:
Ai = Si\
⋃
j≺i
Sj (5.3)
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Proposition 19. With sincere agents, Length Game produces a utilitarian optimal al-
location.
Proof. Given situations P , let A be the allocation produced by Length Game and A′ a
different allocation. That is, there must be some interval I ⊆ Ai such that I ⊆ A′j for
i 6= j. Observe that i ≺ j, otherwise I would have been in Aj . This means |Pi| ≤ |Pj |.
The efficiency gained from I in both cases is then:
|I ∩ Pi|
|Pi| ≤
|I ∩ Pj |
|Pj | (5.4)
because |I ∩Pi| = |I ∩Pj | = |I|. As such A′ cannot improve on the utilitarian efficiency
of A.
The more interesting question, of course, is what happens if the agents strategise.
That is, we want to find the equilibria of Length Game. To proceed we need some
more terminology. An n-tuple of strategies, (S1, ..., Sn), submitted to Length Game as
input we shall call a profile. The region of the cake valued by agent i and only agent i,
Pi\
⋃
Pj , is agent i’s uncontested region. Given a profile (S1, ..., Sn) and the resulting
allocation (A1, ..., An), if Si = Ai for all i, we say the profile is reduced.
We use the standard notion of a pure strategy equilibrium: resistance to deviation
by a single agent.
Definition 4. Let S = (S1, ..., Sn) be a profile and A = (A1, ..., An) the resulting
allocation. We say that S is in equilibrium if there is no i for which there exists a S′i
such that the profile S′ = (S1, ..., S′i, ..., Sn) produces an allocation (A
′
1, ..., A
′
n) where
ui(A
′
i) > ui(Ai)).
An allocation is an equilibrium if it is produced by an equilibrium profile.
Reduced profiles are convenient because they simplify the strategic considerations of
the agents. If an agent sees a region of cake they could get by claiming it, they should
claim it, without paying heed to the other agents.
Example 8. Consider three agents, P1 = [0, 0.5], P2 = [0, 0.6], P3 = [0.5, 1]. Consider
the non-reduced profile, ([0, 0.4], [0.1, 0.5], [0.5, 1]), where the tie is broken in favour of
agent 2. That is, the allocation is ([0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.5], [0.5, 1]). It is not entirely clear what
agent 2 should do. They could claim some of [0.5, 0.6] and get it allocated to them
instead of 3, but by doing so they will lose their tie with 1 and the cake associated with
it.
On the other hand, suppose the profile is ([0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.5], [0.5, 1]). Now agent 2 has
a clear incentive to claim [0.5, 0.6] as there can be no loss in utility from doing so.
As such we would like to restrict our attention to reduced profiles. We need two
lemmata to show that there is no loss of generality in doing so.
30
Lemma 1. Given any profile of Length Game, there exists a reduced profile producing
the same allocation.
Proof. Let S = (S1, ..., Sn) be a profile and A = (A1, ..., An) the resulting allocation.
Construct S′ = (S′1, ..., S′n) such that S′i = Ai.
As portions are disjoint, so must be all S′i. Thus regardless of the order constructed by
Length Game, given S′ the mechanism would simply allocate S′i to agent i, as |S′i\S′j | = 0
for all j. Then S′ is a reduced profile producing A.
Lemma 2. A Length Game profile is in equilibrium only if the associated reduced profile
is in equilibrium.
Proof. Let S be a Length Game profile and S′ the associated reduced profile. Observe
that |Si| ≥ |S′i| for all i.
Suppose S′ is not an equilibrium profile. Then some agent i has an available strategy,
Mi, such that ui(A
∗
i ) > ui(Ai), where A
∗ is the allocation produced by (S′1, ...,Mi, ..., S′n).
As ui(A
∗
i ) > ui(Ai) there must be some sub-interval I ⊆ A∗i , I * Ai. There are two
cases to consider.
If I is not allocated to anyone in S, then clearly agent i has incentive to claim I in
S, so S is not an equilibrium profile.
If I ⊆ Aj , it follows that I ⊆ S′j , so if i is allocated I by playing Mi it must be the
case that |Mi| ≤ |S′j |. Since |S′j | ≤ |Sj |, |Mi| ≤ |Sj |, and i has incentive to play Mi in S,
so it is not an equilibrium profile.
With reduced profiles, we can clearly see that an agent has no incentive to leave their
uncontested region unclaimed.
Lemma 3. A reduced Length Game profile with well behaved agents is in equilibrium
only if every agent’s strategy includes their uncontested region.
Proof. Since agents are well behaved, no other agent would claim i’s uncontested region,
so i can always increase their utility by claiming it.
This gives us all the tools we need to characterise the equilibrium.
Proposition 20. A well behaved reduced Length Game profile is in equilibrium if and
only if:
1.
n⋃
i=1
Pi ⊆
n⋃
i=1
Si (All the valued cake is allocated).
2. Whenever |Si ∩ Pj | 6= 0 for i 6= j, |Si| ≤ |Sj |.
Proof. For the if direction, assume 1 and 2 hold. Assume, for contradiction, that the
profile is not in equilibrium: some agent i by submitting S′i 6= Si can force the allocation
A′, where ui(A′i) > ui(Ai). Thus there is some I ⊆ A′i, I * Ai. I cannot be in i’s
uncontested region, by Lemma 3 we know that I ⊂ Si, and since the profile is reduced
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Si = Ai. Therefore I ⊆ Pj ∩ Pi, j 6= i. We can choose this j such that |Aj ∩ I| 6= 0:
by 1 we know that I is allocated, and by well behavedness we know that it is allocated
to agents that value it. Since Aj = Sj , we have that |Sj ∩ Pi| 6= 0. By 2, we have that
|Sj | ≤ |Si|.
Consider |S′i|. We know that A′i ⊆ S′i, and ui(A′i) > ui(Ai), so with (5.1) we can
derive that:
|A′i ∩ Pi|
|Pi| >
|Ai ∩ Pi|
|Pi| (5.5)
hence |A′i| > |Ai|, and |S′i| > |Si| ≥ |Sj |. But if |S′i| > |Sj |, j will come before i in ≺,
and be allocated I. This gives the desired contradiction.
For the only if direction, first assume 1 fails. Then there is some cake valued by some
i that is not allocated to any j. Agent i can claim that cake and increase their utility,
so the profile is not in equilibrium. Next, assume 2 fails. Then there exist some i, j such
that |Si ∩ Pj | 6= 0 but |Si| > |Sj |. Agent j can claim some of |Si ∩ Pj | and be allocated
it because |Si| > |Sj |, so the profile is not in equilibrium.
Note that with reduced profiles, we can use Si and Ai interchangeably: that is,
Proposition 20 also states the requirements for an equilibrium allocation.
Barring pairwise disjoint preferences, equilibria are non-unique. In fact, there are
infinitely many of them. However, from a utilitarian point of view this is largely irrelevant
as all well behaved equilibria are identical in terms of payoffs.
Definition 5. Two allocations, A and B, are utilitarian equivalent if ui(Ai) = ui(Bi)
for all i.
Before we prove that all well behaved equilibria are utilitarian equivalent we need an
auxiliary result, which is interesting in its own right.
Proposition 21. All well behaved equilibria of Length Game are Pareto efficient.
Proof. Let us first observe that we cannot allocate more cake than is available. Equi-
valently, we cannot allocate more valued cake than we have. Thus for any allocation
A:
n∑
i=1
|Ai ∩ Pi| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
n⋃
i=1
Pi
∣∣∣∣∣ (5.6)
If A is a Length Game equilibrium, we can strengthen the above into an equality;
we have seen in Proposition 20 that all the valued cake is allocated.
Now, suppose thatA′ is a Pareto improvement onA. That is, for all i, ui(A′i) ≥ ui(Ai)
and for some j, uj(A
′
j) ≥ uj(Aj). Invoking (5.1):
|A′i ∩ Pi|
|Pi| ≥
|Ai ∩ Pi|
|Pi| (5.7)
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for all i, and:
|A′j ∩ Pj |
|Pj | >
|Aj ∩ Pj |
|Pj | (5.8)
for some j.
Multiplying out the denominators this is equivalent to |A′i ∩ Pi| ≥ |Ai ∩ Pi| and
|A′j ∩ Pj | > |Aj ∩ Pj |, and thus:
n∑
i=1
|A′i ∩ Pi| >
n∑
i=1
|Ai ∩ Pi| =
∣∣∣∣∣
n⋃
i=1
Pi
∣∣∣∣∣ (5.9)
which gives us an impossibility.
Proposition 22. All well behaved equilibria of Length Game are utilitarian equivalent.
Proof. Let S and S′ be two reduced, well behaved equilibrium profiles that are not
utilitarian equivalent. Let W be the set of all i such that ui(A
′
i) > ui(Ai). From
Proposition 21 we know that there is also a non-empty set L consisting of agents j
where uj(A
′
j) < uj(Aj). All other agents will constitute the set N .
Recall that in equilibria the entire valued cake is allocated, giving us the identity:∑
i∈W
|A′i|+
∑
i∈N
|A′i|+
∑
i∈L
|A′i| =
∑
i∈W
|Ai|+
∑
i∈N
|Ai|+
∑
i∈L
|Ai| (5.10)
∑
i∈W
|A′i|+
∑
i∈L
|A′i| =
∑
i∈W
|Ai|+
∑
i∈L
|Ai| (5.11)
∑
i∈W
|A′i| −
∑
i∈W
|Ai| =
∑
i∈L
|Ai| −
∑
i∈L
|A′i| (5.12)
We claim that both sides of (5.12) must be positive. If not, this would mean that
all agents in L attain less utility in A′ despite the fact that they have at least as much
cake between them as they did before. This is only possible if some agent receives some
cake that they do not value, but this cannot be the case because well behaved equilibria
of Length Game are not wasteful.
Consider a j ∈ L. As uj(A′j) < uj(Aj), there exists an interval I ⊆ Pj such that
I ⊆ Aj , I * A′j . However I is valued, so I ⊆ A′k for some k. As S′ is an equilibrium,
|S′k| ≤ |S′j |. As S is an equilibrium, |Sj | ≤ |Sk|. Given that the profiles are reduced and
uj(A
′
j) < uj(Aj), we complete the chain to get |S′k| ≤ |S′j | < |Sj | ≤ |Sk|. |S′k| < |Sk|,
hence uk(A
′
k) < uk(Ak), hence k ∈ L. Thus the agents in L do not lose any cake to
agents outside of it, and as allocations are not wasteful at least one agent in L must be
no worse off in A′ than in A, giving us a contradiction.
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5.3 Characterisations
Having shown that all well behaved equilibria of Length Game have the same payoffs,
we know wish to ask what these payoffs are. An important result is that from a con-
sequentialist perspective, this mechanism is not new. In equilibrium it produces the
same payoffs as Mechanism 9.
Proposition 23. Consider a cake cutting situation with piecewise uniform preferences
(P1, ..., Pn). Let (A1, ..., An) be the allocation produced by Mechanism 9. Then (A1, ..., An)
is a well behaved equilibrium profile of Length Game given the same preferences.
Proof. It suffices to show that S = (A1, ..., An) satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition
20. Recall that a subroutine of Mechanism 9 takes a subset of agents, A, and of cake, X
as input. D(A,X) is all the regions of X valued by at least one agent in A and:
avg(A,X) =
|D(A,X)|
#A
(5.13)
To see that all the valued cake is allocated, consider an arbitrary interval I ⊆ Pi
for some i. Consider the subroutine on A,X where i ∈ A. Let I ′ ⊆ I be the part of I
that was not yet allocated. That is, I ′ = I ∩ X. As I ′ ⊆ Pi, I ′ ⊆ D(A,X). So after this
subroutine I ′ will certainly be allocated to some agent.
To see that whenever |Ai ∩ Pj | 6= 0 for i 6= j, |Ai| ≤ |Aj |., we consider two cases:
Case one: there is a subroutine on A and X such that i, j ∈ A. The mechanism
allocates all agents in A a portion of length avg(A,X), so |Ai| = |Aj |.
Case two: there are subroutines on A′, X′ and A∗, X∗ such that i ∈ A′ and j ∈ A∗.
Suppose |Ai ∩ Pj | 6= 0. Then the subroutine on A′, X′ must be executed first, because
all of Pj would be allocated after the subroutine on A
∗. Since subroutines are executed
in order of increasing avg(A,X), avg(A′,X′) ≤ avg(A∗,X∗). So |Ai| ≤ |Aj |.
Corollary 4. All well behaved equilibria of Length Game are envy free.
Proof. Mechanism 9 produces an envy free allocation which is also a well behaved equi-
librium. Proposition 22 establishes that all well behaved equilibria of Length Game are
utilitarian equivalent, so they must all be envy free.
Corollary 5. Mechanism 9 is Pareto efficient.
Proof. Proposition 22 and 21.
This gives us two mechanisms which produce different allocations with sincere agents,
but have the same equilibria given strategic behaviour. One mechanism induces truthful
behaviour in agents, the other admits a dominant strategy equilibrium. This should be
reminiscent of a result from implementation theory:
Theorem 3 (Revelation Principle). Given a cake cutting situation with finitely repres-
entable preferences, if a mechanism M1 has dominant strategy equilibria, there exists a
truthful mechanism M2 that produces utilitarian equivalent allocations.
34
Proof. This is a well known result in Economics. See, for instance, [Mye83].
The idea behind the construction is that M2, termed the direct revelation mechanism,
takes the utility functions of the agents as input. It then simulates the behaviour of the
agents given M1 and thus produces the allocation.
In our case Length Game is the na¨ıve mechanism, and Mechanism 9 is the direct
revelation equivalent. This is akin to the contrast between first and second price auctions:
with sincere agents the first price auction generates higher revenue, while its equilibrium
is equivalent to that of the strategy-proof second price auction. Within auction theory,
the Revenue Equivalence theorem suggests that this is the best one can hope to achieve.
We prove a similar result with respect to the utilitarian efficiency of piecewise uniform
cake cutting situations.
Theorem 4. If a mechanism produces an allocation with a higher utilitarian efficiency
in some piecewise uniform situation than Mechanism 9, there is a situation in which it
produces an allocation with a lower utilitarian efficiency.
Proof. The key in this proof is that if a mechanism produces allocation (A1, ..., An) in
situation (P1, ..., Pn), then in any situation of the form (P1, ..., P
′
i , ..., Pn) agent i can
force allocation (A1, ..., Ai, ..., An) by casting the same strategy they would have cast
had their preferences been Pi.
Suppose that in situation P = (P1, ..., Pn) Mechanism 9 produces allocation A =
(A1, ..., An) while mechanism M
∗ produces allocation A∗ = (A∗1, ..., A∗n) such that
UE(A∗) > UE(A). There must therefore be some i such that ui(A∗i ) > ui(Ai). Given
Proposition 21, there is also a j with uj(A
∗
j ) < uj(Aj). If there is more than one such j,
pick one with the largest |Pj |. We consider two cases.
Case one: |Pj | < 1. Consider the situation P ′ where P ′i = [0, 1], P ′k = Pk for k 6= i.
Under mechanism 9 the allocation produced is A′. Observe that |A′i| ≤ |Ai|: agent i can
force allocation A, and since they do not it must be because they have no incentive in
doing so. Since |A∗i | > |Ai|, |A∗i | > |A′i|. To achieve this, agent i must be given some
cake by M∗ that Mechanism 9 gave to j instead. There is some interval I ⊆ A′j , I ⊆ A∗i .
Observe that giving I to i raises i’s utility by |I|, but lowers j’s by |I|/|Pj |, |Pj | < 1.
Since we picked j to have the largest |Pj | out of all agents that lost utility, this means
that UE(A∗) < UE(A′).
Case two: |Pj | = 1. Consider the situation P ′ as above: agent i with preferences
[0, 1] pretends to value Pi to force allocation A
∗ in M∗. Suppose j pretends to value
|P ∗j | < 1. If this will yield them a larger slice, then A∗ is not an equilibrium. If this
does not, then we fall back to case one and in the situation (P ′1, ..., P ∗j , ...P
′
n), M
∗ would
attain a lower utilitarian efficiency than Mechanism 9.
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6 Conclusion
We have summarised the main results in the history of cake cutting, placing our focus on
the mechanisms themselves, rather than measure theoretic existence results. This has
revealed that concerns of efficiency and truthfulness are relatively new developments in
the field.
As we have seen there may be good reasons for this: impossibility results abound
when optimal allocations are concerned. The general cake cutting model is too broad
to allow such allocations to be effected. Even if the desired optimum exists, obtaining
it may be impossible if it is against the interests of the agents to do so.
We have, however, found a candidate for the “next best” solution in the case of
piecewise uniform preferences: a mechanism that is never dominated by another, first
presented in [CLPP10] and given a superficially different, but equivalent, characterisation
here.
While the number of unresolved questions is vast, perhaps the most pertinent one
here is whether there are similar results for piecewise constant preferences. Likewise,
do non-trivial truthful mechanisms exist in such a case? The restriction to piecewise
uniform preferences allowed us to sidestep a plethora of issues that would arise in such a
situation. In fact, we conjecture that given the simplicity of the preferences Mechanism
9 is in some sense unique: perhaps all envy free, non-wasteful mechanisms must produce
allocations which coincide with the equilibria of Length Game.
In a more general setting, even with the combined tools of Mathematics, Economics
and Computer Science at our disposal it would seem that further progress will be no
cakewalk.
36
A Table of Mechanisms
Mechanism Comments Introduced in Page
Cut and Choose 2 agents, R-W, Pr, EF, WT Prehistoric 12
Last Diminisher R-W, Pr, WT [Ste48] 13
Selfridge’s Algorithm 3 agents, R-W, Pr, EF, WT [Woo80] 14
Four Knives 3 agents, MK, Pr, EF, WT [Str80] 15
Austin’s Scheme 2 agents, MK, Pr, EF, Eq, WT [Aus82] 16
Four Agent Moving Knife 4 agents, MK, Pr, EF, WT [BTZ97] 16
Mechanism 7 R-W, Pr, WT [EP84] 18
Mechanism 8 RP, Pr, EF, Eq, Tr [CLPP10],[MT10] 20
Mechanism 9 RP, Pr, EF, Tr [CLPP10] 20
Lex Order RP, Tr Present work 29
Length Game RP, Nv Present work 29
Legend
R-W Robertson-Webb protocol
MK Moving knife protocol
RP Revelation protocol
Pr Proportional mechanism
EF Envy free mechanism
Eq Equitable mechanism
Nv Na¨ıve mechanism
WT Weakly truthful mechanism
Tr Truthful mechanism
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B Robertson-Webb Formulations
In this appendix we give Robertson-Webb formulations of mechanisms that appear in
this text. Recall that the allowed queries are eval(a,b) and cut(a,x). We will use
subscripts to indicate the agent queried. That is, evali(a,b) would query agent i to
evaluate the slice [a, b]. If it is understood that X = [x1, x2] is a slice, we may write
evali(X) instead of evali(x1,x2). As before, A is the allocation and Ai is the portion
of agent i in A. A is the set of agents. #A = n.
Mechanism 1: Cut and Choose
a =cut1(0,0.5)
if eval2(0,a)>eval2(a,1):
A1 = [a, 1], A2 = [0, a]
else:
A1 = [0, a], A2 = [a, 1]
return A
Mechanism 2: Last Diminisher
s = 0
l = 1
while A 6= ∅
for i in A :
if evali(s,l)> 1/n:
last=i
if #A > 1:
l =cut1(s,1/n)
Alast = [s, l]
s = l
l = 1
A = A\{last}
return A
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Mechanism 3: Selfridge’s Algorithm
a =cut1(0,1/3)
b =cut1(a,1/3)
X =argmax
{[0,a],[a,b],[b,1]}
eval2(x)= [x1, x2]
Z =argmin
{[0,a],[a,b],[b,1]}
eval2(x)= [z1, z2]
Y = [0, 1]\X ∪ Z = [y1, y2]
v =eval2(Y)
c =cut2(x1,Y)
X ′ = [x1, c]
if eval3(X’)≥eval3(Y) and eval3(X’)≥eval3(Y):
A3 = A3 ∪X ′
Case= 1
if eval1(Y)≥eval1(Z)
A1 = A1 ∪ Y
A2 = A2 ∪ Z
else :
A1 = A1 ∪ Z
A2 = A2 ∪ Y
else if eval3(Y)≥eval3(X’) and eval3(Y)≥eval3(Z):
A3 = A3 ∪ Y
if eval1(Z)≥eval1(X’)
A1 = A1 ∪ Z
A2 = A2 ∪X ′
Case= 2
else :
A1 = A1 ∪X ′
A2 = A2 ∪ Z
Cut and Choose({2, 3}, [c, x2])
else:
A3 = A3 ∪ Z
if eval1(Y)≥eval1(X’)
A1 = A1 ∪ Y
A2 = A2 ∪X ′
Case= 2
else :
A1 = A1 ∪X ′
A2 = A2 ∪ Y
Cut and Choose({2, 3}, [c, x2])
if Case== 1:
u =eval2([c,x2])
d =cut2(0,1/3*u)
e =cut2(d,1/3*u)
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if eval3(c,d)≥eval3(d,e) and eval3(c,d)≥eval3(e,x2):
A3 = A3 ∪ [c, d]
if eval1(d,e)≥eval1(e,x2)
A1 = A1 ∪ [d, e]
A2 = A2 ∪ [e, x2]
else :
A1 = A1 ∪ [e, x2]
A2 = A2 ∪ [d, e]
else if eval3(d,e)≥eval3(c,d) and eval3(d,e)≥eval3(e,x2):
A3 = A3 ∪ [d, e]
if eval1(c,d)≥eval1(e,x2)
A1 = A1 ∪ [c, d]
A2 = A2 ∪ [e, x2]
else :
A1 = A1 ∪ [e, x2]
A2 = A2 ∪ [c, d]
else :
A3 = A3 ∪ [e, x2]
if eval1(d,e)≥eval1(c,d)
A1 = A1 ∪ [d, e]
A2 = A2 ∪ [c, d]
else :
A1 = A1 ∪ [c, d]
A2 = A2 ∪ [d, e]
else :
u =eval3([c,x2])
d =cut3(0,1/3*u)
e =cut3(d,1/3*u)
if eval2(c,d)≥eval2(d,e) and eval2(c,d)≥eval2(e,x2):
A2 = A2 ∪ [c, d]
if eval1(d,e)≥eval1(e,x2)
A1 = A1 ∪ [d, e]
A3 = A3 ∪ [e, x2]
else :
A1 = A1 ∪ [e, x2]
A3 = A3 ∪ [d, e]
else if eval2(d,e)≥eval2(c,d) and eval2(d,e)≥eval2(e,x2):
A2 = A2 ∪ [d, e]
if eval1(c,d)≥eval1(e,x2)
A1 = A1 ∪ [c, d]
A3 = A3 ∪ [e, x2]
else :
A1 = A1 ∪ [e, x2]
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A3 = A3 ∪ [c, d]
else :
A2 = A2 ∪ [e, x2]
if eval1(d,e)≥eval1(c,d)
A1 = A1 ∪ [d, e]
A3 = A3 ∪ [c, d]
else :
A1 = A1 ∪ [c, d]
A3 = A3 ∪ [d, e]
return A
Mechanism 7
Subroutine(A,[0, 1])
return A
Subroutine(A, [s, t]):
if #A = 1
Ai = [s, t], i ∈ A
break
for i in A :
v =evali(s,t)
mi =cuti(s,1/2*v)
Form array L where L[i] ∈ A and mL[i] < mL[j] implies i < j.
for j ≤ #A/2 :
A = A ∪ {L[j]}
Subroutine(A1,[s,mb#A/2c])
Subroutine(A\A1,[mb#A/2c, t])
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